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The Pennsylvania School Code Requires a School
District to Credit Teachers for Past Years of Service
When Placing Those Teachers on a Local Salary
Schedule
PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL CODE - 24 PA CONS. STAT. § 11-1142 and
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-11429 - SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
under the essence test, an arbitration award that denied re-hired
teachers credit for prior years of service within the same school
district for purposes of placement on a district's local salary scale
violated the Pennsylvania School Code.
Mifflinburg Area Education Ass'n v. Mifflinburg Area School
District, 724 A.2d 339 (Pa. 1999).
In 1988, the Mifflinburg Area School District ("District") entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the Mifflinburg Area
Education Association ("Association") for the five school years
between 1988 and 1993.1 The agreement contained a fifteen step
salary schedule that established the compensation levels of each of
the District's professional employees based on the employee's years
of service with the District.2 The schedule provided that the District
could determine the salary step for an employee who did not work
for the District during the entire proceeding school term.3 After
approving the collective bargaining agreement, the District and the
Association placed each of the District's professional employees on
1. See Mifflinburg Area Educ. Ass'n v. Mifflinburg Area Sch. Dist., 724 A.2d 339, 340
(Pa. 1999). The Association is "the bargaining representative for the professional employees
of the [District]." See id.
2. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 341. The salary step schedule provided:
ARTICLE XIII - COMPENSATION: An employee shall be placed on their [sic] salary
step on the first day of each school term and no change in salary step shall be made
during the school term. The salary step on the first day of a school term shall be one
higher than the step on which the district placed the employee for the immediately
preceding school term. The district shall determine the salary step for an employee
who did not actually work as a professional or temporary professional employee for
the district during the whole immediately preceding school term.
See id.
3. See id.
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the new local salary scale.4
In 1994, the Association filed a grievance on behalf of eight
teachers of the District who claimed that the District had not
placed them on the appropriate level of the salary scale.5 The
teachers, who were District employees during the 1988 school year,
did not have a record of continuous employment with the District;
at some point in the past they left employment for various reasons
and were later rehired by the District.6 Most of the teachers were
female employees who had taken several years off to raise
children.7 The Association argued that the District's failure to grant
the teachers credit for past years of employment served prior to
their breaks in employment violated the Pennsylvania School Code
("School Code").
8
The case was heard by an arbitrator, which entered an award in
4. See id.
5. See id. at 341.
6. See id. For example, the District employed Carol Brann for four years (1960 through
1964); Brann then resigned from employment for 13 years and was rehired by the District in
1977. Id. at, 341 n3. In 1988, when Brann was placed on the salary schedule following
approval of the 1988-1993 collective bargaining agreement, she was placed on Step 6 of the
schedule (corresponding to eleven years of service) instead of Step 8 (corresponding to
fifteen years of service), which would have recognized her prior years of service. See id.
7. See MiOflinburg, 724 A.2d at 341.
8. Id.; 24 PA- CoNS. STAT. § 11-1142(a) (1992). Section 1142(a) of the School Code
provides in pertinent part:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, all school districts and vocational school
districts shall pay all regular and temporary teachers.., in the public schools of the
district the minimum salaries and increments . . . as provided in the following
tabulation in accordance with the column in which the professional employe is
grouped and the step which the professional employe has attained by years of
experience within the school district each step after step 1 constituting one year of
service. When a school district, by agreement places a professional employe on a step
in the salary scale, each step thereafter shall constitute one year of service. When a
district adopts a salary schedule in excess of the state-mandated minimum scale, it
shall not be deemed to have altered or increased the step which the employe has
gained through years of service.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1142(a) (1992). In 1988, the legislature enacted 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §
11-1142.1, which supersedes 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1142. However, section 1142.1 merely
raises the minimum salaries paid to teachers in the Commonwealth to $18,500 beginning in
the 1988-89 school term, and was inapplicable to the Mifflinburg case because the collective
bargaining agreement in Mifflinburg was entered into prior to the effective date of section
1142.1. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1142.1 (1992).
Section 1149 of the School Code provides:
The increments herein provided for are applicable only where the beneficiaries
thereof remain in the service of the same school district. Where such teachers enter a
new district they shall enter at a point in the schedule to be agreed upon between
said teachers and the employing district, which agreements shall be made part of the
contract between them.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1149 (1992).
Education Ass'n v. Mifflinburg
favor of the District.9 The Association appealed to the Union
County Court of Common Pleas, which vacated the arbitrator's
award and ordered that the teachers be placed on the appropriate
step of the District's salary schedule taking into account the
teachers' prior years of service in the District.10 The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court reversed the order of the trial court and
reinstated the arbitrator's award."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to review the
issue of whether the arbitrator's failure to grant credit for past
years of service violated the Pennsylvania School Code. 2 Justice
Ralph Cappy, writing for a majority of three justices, 3 reversed the
order of the commonwealth court and reinstated the order of the.
Union County Court of Common Pleas, finding that the arbitrator's
award violated the School Code.'
4
In reversing the lower appellate court, Justice Cappy first noted
that the applicable standard of review for appeals of arbitrators'
decisions is the "essence" test. 5 The essence test is a deferential
standard of review that limits the appellate court to a
determination of whether the essence of an arbitration award can
be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agteement. 16
Relying on Community College of Beaver County v. Society of the
Faculty,1 7 the Mifflinburg court announced that the essence test is
the appropriate standard when reviewing an arbitration award
under the Pennsylvania Employe Relations Act.18 The court further
9. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 341-42.
10. See id. at 342.
11. See id. The commonwealth court found that the trial court had relied on an overly
broad standard of review and had erred in concluding that the arbitrator's denial of credit
for past years of service was not a reasonable and legitimate interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Appellant's Brief at Appendix A, Mifflinburg (No. 1142 C.D. 1995).
12. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 340.
13. The majority consisted of Justices Cappy, Castille and Nigro. See id. at 339. Justice
Zappala dissented, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty. See id. Justice Newman did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the case. See id.
14. See id. at 344.
15. See id. at 342.
16. See id. at 342, 344 n.6, 346 n.5. See also Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass'n v.
Appalachia Intermediate Unit 08, 476 A 2d 360 (Pa. 1984).
17. 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977). In Community College of Beaver County, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an arbitration award must be upheld if it can in any
rational way be derived from the collective bargaining agreement in light of language,
context, and other indicia of the parties' intention. See id. at 1273. See also Arbitration Act of
April 5, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, § 11, 5 P.S. § 171 (Arbitration Act of 1927), superseded by 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7302-7325 (Uniform Arbitration Act); Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 344 n.6.
18. See id. The court concluded that section 7302(d)(2) of the Uniform Arbitration Act
was a "substantial reenactment of the corresponding provision of the Arbitration Act of 1927
2000
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found that the judiciary had the right to correct or modify an
arbitration award that is contrary to law.19
The Mifflinburg majority found that the arbitrator's decision was
contrary to law, explaining that Pennsylvania statutory law
provides that "actions taken pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement cannot violate the School Code."? In particular, section
703 of the Public Employe Relations Act ("PERA") 2' prohibits
parties of a collective bargaining process from implementing a
provision in the agreement that would violate or conflict with a
statutory enactment. 22 Moreover, the majority noted that section
1121 of the School Code, relating to the form and execution of
contracts between school districts and professional employees,
requires that all such contracts contain a clause stating that none
of the provisions of the School Code may be waived by school
district employees.23 Thus, the court concluded that, because the
1988-1993 collective bargaining agreement was inconsistent with
the mandates of the School Code that (according to the majority's
interpretation) required granting credit for past years of service, the
salary schedule was invalid as a matter of law.
24
In interpreting the School Code, the court noted that the District
believed its sole obligation under the School Code was to pay its
professional employees a minimum salary as set forth in the
statute. 25 However, Justice Cappy interpreted sections 1142(a) and
1149 to require a school district to credit teachers for past years of
service upon rehire.26 The court reasoned that to deprive teachers
of credit for past years of service within the same school district
and that the standard of review of an arbitration award under the Public Employee Relations
Act is the same regardless of which arbitration act applies." Id.
19. See id.; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd v. Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist., 451 A.2d
671 (Pa. 1982).
20. Id. at 343-44, 342.
21. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101.101-1101.999 (1992). PERA provides in relevant part as
follows:
[t]he parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision
would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or
statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or
the provisions of municipal home rule charters.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.703 (1992).
22. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 342.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. This position is adopted by the dissent. See id. at 345-46 (Zappala, J.,
dissenting).
26. See id. at 343.
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would create a great injustice. 2 The majority found that the
legislative intent behind the provisions in question was to protect
an employee's valuable years of experience within the same school
district.28 Thus, the court concluded that the collective bargaining
agreement abrogated the teachers' statutorily protected rights by
depriving teachers of credit for prior years of service.2 9 Further,
because the arbitrator's award in favor of the District violated the
School Code, the court found that the award did not satisfy the
essence test.
3 0
In granting teachers credit for past years of employment, the
Mifflinburg court relied on Centennial School District v.
Centennial Education Ass'n,3 which upheld an arbitrator's decision
that rehired teachers were entitled to credit for prior years of
teaching under sections 1142 and 1149 of the School Code.
32
Finally, the majority distinguished the 1980 Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case of Wildrick v. Board of Directors of Sayre Area School
District,3 finding that the issue in Wildrick had no relevance to the
present dispute because Wildrick did not address placement on a
salary schedule after a break in employment.34
Justice Stephen Zappala dissented from the Mifflinburg majority
opinion, maintaining that section 1142 of the School Code does not
27. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 343. Depriving teachers of previous years of service
penalized women who took time off from their careers to care for children at a time when
maternity leaves were not commonplace. Frequently, school districts rehired teachers on a
lower step of the salary scale than the employee had reached before they resigned from the
district. See Carmen J. Lee and Laura Pace, Rehired Teachers Can't Lose Their Seniority,
PITTSBURGH PoST-GAZETTE, April 18, 1999, at DI.
28. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 343.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 343-44.
31. 576 A.2d 99 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). In Centennial, the commonwealth court
reviewed the arbitrator's analysis and Pennsylvania precedent, including Wildrick v. Board of
Directors of Sayre Area School District, 417 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1980), involving salary step
placement issues. See Centennial, 576 A-2d at 101-04. Applying the essence test, the
Centennial court concluded that the arbitrator's decision was consistent with case law and
that the arbitrator was correct in granting relief to the teachers. See id. at 102-04.
32. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 343.
33. 417 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1980).
34. See id. at 343. In Wildrick, the teachers (unsuccessfully) argued that the School
Code requires a district "to apply to its local salary schedule that step in the statutory
schedule which was intended by the Legislature to determine the minimum pay for
teachers." Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 343. In Mifflinburg, the teachers (successfully) argued
that the School Code, which sets the minimum salaries for professional employees of school
districts, also requires a district to credit teachers for all years of past service when placing
those teachers on a local salary scale that sets salaries in excess of the School Code's
minimums. See id.
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support the majority's interpretation that teachers should be
credited for years of employment prior to rehire.35 According to the
Mifflinburg dissent, the School Code merely establishes the
minimum salaries for professional employees based upon years of
experience with the school district.3 The dissent reasoned that the
fact that the District adopted a salary scale in excess of the
state-mandated minimum does not require the District to credit
teachers for past years of service with the District; once a district
pays salaries in excess of the minimums set forth in the School
Code, the statutory mandate has been satisfied.
37
Justice Zappala explained that the language of section 1142 does
not support the majority's interpretation of the provision.as He
found support for his position in the title of section 1142(a),
"Minimum Salaries and Increments."39 Applying rules of statutory
construction, Justice Zappala maintained that the provision's
heading reflects its sole subject matter; section 1142(a) merely
requires a school district to compensate its employees at the
minimum salary levels established in the School Code.40 The dissent
also cited Wildrick to support its contention that sections 1142 and
1149 require only the payment of minimum salaries.
41
35. See Mifflinburg, 724 A2d at 345. (Zappala, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Flaherty
joined in Justice Zappala's dissent. See id. (Zappala, J., dissenting).
36. See id. (Zappala, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 346 (Zappala, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that, in this case, each of
the teachers were placed on a step on the District's salary scale greater than that required by
the step mandated by the School Code. See id. at 345 n.3 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
38. See id. (Zappala, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Zappala pointed out the
language of the final section of section 11-1142, which provides, "When a district adopts a
salary scale in excess of the mandated scale, it shall not be deemed to have altered or
increased the step which the employe has gained through years of service." 24 P.S. §
11-1142(a) n2. Justice Zappala also asserted that, to the extent that Centennial conflicts with
the dissent's interpretation of the Code, Centennial should be overruled. See id. at 346 n.4
(Zappala, J., dissenting).
39. See Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 346 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
40. See id. (Zappala, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 345-46 (Zappala, J., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
in Wildrick held that "[tihe law requires that a teacher with certain experience and
qualifications be paid a certain salary and if a school district does that it has met its duty
under the law. A School District may not pay less, but it has not been required to pay more."
Wildrick v. Board of Directors of Sayre Area Sch. Dist., 367 A.2d 768, 771 (Pa. Comrnw. Ct.
1976). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, stating,
We are in agreement with the Commonwealth Court's reading of the Public School
Code . . . . [NIothing contained in the Code, either as originally enacted or as
amended, in any respect prescribes any particular means by which greater salaries
must be determined. The sole limitation the Legislature has imposed is the
requirement that a school district comply with the applicable statewide minimum
salary schedule.
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Finally, Justice Zappala maintained that, while the deferential
essence test is the proper standard of review in cases challenging
an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement,
the more stringent plenary standard of review of arbitration awards
is appropriate in those cases where an arbitrator interprets
statutory law that is incorporated into a collective bargaining
agreement. 42 The dissent concluded that because the arbitrator's
decision was a legitimate, reasonable interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, and was consistent with statutory
law, the arbitrator's award should be affirmed. 43
The Pennsylvania School Code, also known as the Public School
Code, was originally enacted in 1949. 4 The fundamental purpose of
the School Code was "to establish a thorough and efficient system
of public education, to which every child has a right."45  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that teacher tenure positions
must be considered in light of this purpose.
46
Under the original enactment of the School Code, section 1142
provided for minimum annual statutory salaries and service
increments to be granted to teachers for each year of service.41 In
1963, section 1142 was amended to raise the minimum annual
salary from $3,600 to $4,200, and to raise the minimum annual
service increments from $200 to $300.48 Throughout the years, the
Pennsylvania legislature has periodically adjusted the minimum
Wildrick, 417 A.2d at 619-20.
42. See id. at 346 n.5 (Zappala, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board v. Bald Eagle Area School District, 451 A.2d 671 (Pa, 1982), which
holds that judicial relief is available if an arbitration award conflicts with statutory law. See
id. at 346 (Zappala, J., dissenting). In dueling footnotes, the majority and the dissenters
argued over the proper standard of review to apply in this case. See id. at 344 n.6; 346 n.5
(Zappala, J., dissenting). Curiously, the majority, which overruled the arbitrator's decision,
argued for a more deferential standard of review (the essence test), whereas the dissenters,
who would reinstate the arbitrator's award, argued for a more stringent standard (plenary).
See id. at 344 n.6; 346 n.5 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Footnote 6 of the majority opinion is a
lengthy attack on the dissenting Justice Zappala's reliance on Bald Eagle. See id. at 344 n.6.
In footnote 5 of the dissenting opinion, Justice Zappala defends his reliance on Bald Eagle
by reminding the majority of his use of the signal "see generally" before citing the case as an
indication of his recognition that it does not provide clear support for his proposition. See
id. at 346 n.5 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (citing COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ET AL, THE BLUEBOOK A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATIONS Rule 1.2(d) (16th ed. 1996)).
43. See id. at 346 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
44. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 PS. §§ 1-101 to 27-2702 (1992).
45. Danson v. Casey, 382 A.2d 1238 (Pa Comnw. Ct. 1978), affirmed, 399 A.2d 360
(1979).
46. Johnson v. United Sch. Dist. Joint School Bd., 191 A.2d 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
47. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, 24 P.S. § 11-1142 (1992).
48. Act of August 1, 1963, PL. 466.
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salaries established in the School Code and the variables governing
salary calculations, such as professional qualifications and years of
service.49 The legislature's intent in mandating salary increases has
been to raise the income level of teachers employed within the
Commonwealth.
50
In 1965, the state legislature amended section 1142 by what has
become known as "Act 405."5 Act 405 provided that minimum
salaries and annual increments would be measured by steps, each
step representing progressive and maximum salary increments for
each year of service rendered by a professional employee. 52 Under
Act 405, an employee would attain placement at a particular step
either by agreement with the school district or through the
employee's years of service within the school district, whichever
led to the higher placement.5 The same concept was carried over
by a 1968 amendment known as "Act 96."5 Act 96, the last relevant
amendment to section 1142, also added the following language:
"When a district adopts a salary scale in excess of the mandated
scale, it shall not be deemed to have altered or increased the step
which the employe has gained through years of service."
55
As a result of these amendments, disputes have arisen between
teachers and school districts over the compensation to which a
teacher is entitled under section 1142 of the School Code. Welsh v.
Wilkes-Barre Board of Education5 was one of the first cases to
interpret the intent and purpose of Section 1142 with respect to a
49. See Wildrick v. Board of Dir. of Sayre Area Sch. Dist., 417 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1980).
50. See Raymond v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 142 A.2d 749, 751-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
51. 1965 Pa Laws 1057. Section 2(a) of Act 405 assigns to a teacher "the step which
the professional employe has attained by agreement or by years of experience within the
school district whichever is higher, each step after step a constituting one year of service."
1965 Pa. Laws 1057, Section 2(a). Section 2(e) makes payable for the "school year 1965-1966,
and each school year thereafter" an annual salary which:
shall include an annual service increment for service in the previous school year by
advancing the salary of the . . . employe to the next higher step on the minimum
salary schedule from the step attained by the employe in the previous school year or
the step in which he was entitled to be placed by virtue of years of experience within
the district, whichever is higher.
1965 Pa. Laws 1057, Section 2(e).
52. See id. Before 1965, the Code referred to years of service but contained no step
variable. Id. Act 405 also set forth a table that establishes specific step placements. Id.
53. See id.
54. See 1968 Pa. Laws 192.
55. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1142(a) (1992) (Supp. 1989-90). Although the last amendment
to section 1142 was made in 1972, no changes material to the issues in this case were made.
1972 Pa. Laws 1338, No. 289, § 1.
56. 46 Pa. D. & C.2d 61 (Comm. Pleas Luzerne Co. 1968).
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teacher's placement on a salary schedule.57  Welsh addressed the
question of whether, in calculating a teacher's salary, a school
district must give credit for previous service awarded by the
employment agreement in addition to credit for experience in the
district under Act 405.58 The court concluded that a teacher was
entitled to teaching credit as evidenced by the salary set forth in
the contract of employment in addition to the annual salary
increments earned by the teacher within the district.5 9
In Welsh, 58 teachers and supervisory employees alleged that the
Wilkes-Barre School District did not place plaintiffs on the
appropriate step of its local salary schedule. 60 In addressing the
parties' arguments, the court analyzed three example situations that
it believed were representative of the claims of the 58 plaintiffs, all
of whom were included in one of the examples.
61
In the first example, Teacher 'A had five years of experience
outside of the district at the time the Wilkes-Barre District hired
him.62 The district hired teacher 'A' at a salary level crediting him
with two years of service in the district.6 The dispute involved
whether teacher 'A should be placed on Step 3 of the salary scale
or on Step 5, which would include the two-year credit."
Interpreting sections 1142 and 1149 of the School Code,65 the court
determined that the original employment contract granting two
years of credit should be honored, and that teacher 'A: should be
placed on Step 5.66 The court reasoned that a failure to grant
57. Welsh, 46 Pa. D. & C.2d at 61-62.
58. See id. at 62. Specifically, the parties stipulated that the issue was "whether or not,
under Act No. 405 of 1965, Section 2 [24 PA- CONS. STAT. § 11-1142(a) (1992)], the defendants,
the Wilkes-Barre School District, in placing plaintiffs on steps of the salary schedule, must
give credit for salary steps achieved by the plaintiffs, not only by experience in the district,
but also by agreement in the employment contracts." Id.
59. See id. at 72-73.
60. See id. at 61-62.
61. See id. at 64-72.
62. See Welsh, 46 Pa- D. & C.2d at 64.
63. See id. at 64.
64. See id. at 65.
65. Section 1149 states that when "such teachers enter a new district they shall enter
at a point in the schedule to be agreed upon between said teachers and the employing
districts, which agreement shall be made a part of the contract between them." 24 PA- CONS.
STAT. § 11-1142(a) (1992).
66. Welsh, 46 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 66-68. The court stated, "The salary of a teacher is
governed by the contract entered into by the teacher and the school district into which are
read the existing laws." Id. The court noted that under section 1142, an employee was
entitled "to the next higher step on the minimum salary schedule from the step attained by
the employee in the previous year." Id. at 65 (citing section 1142(e)). The court reasoned
that, due to the original two years' increments awarded by the employment agreement plus
2000 1003
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teacher 'A' credit for previous years served outside the district
would permit the district to renegotiate the original contract
between the district and the employee.67
In contrast, Teacher 'B', who also had five years experience
outside the district, was hired at a salary that gave no credit for
prior experience. 68 The court found that teacher 'B' should be
placed on Step 3 of the salary schedule because he waived his
experience outside the district when he signed the contract of
employment.69
Finally, teacher 'C' had no teaching experience whatsoever when
the Wilkes-Barre School District hired him at a salary higher than
that paid to a teacher with five years experience within the
district. 70 The court concluded that, under Act 405, teacher 'C'
should be given credit for the five years experience granted him in
the employment agreement since this credit was negotiated
between the teacher and the school district and was evidenced by
the written contract of employment. 7' Thus, the fact that Act 405
sets forth minimum salaries does not deprive an employee from
negotiating a higher salary, and a district must honor its obligations
under the employment contract.72
A similar issue was addressed in Graybill v. Juniata County
School District,73 in which four teachers claimed that the school
district paid salaries lower Othan that mandated by the School
Code. 74 The teachers, who began their service with the school
district as early as 1957 and had remained employed through the
1972-73 school year, argued that, under Act 405, they had been
underpaid. 7' The plaintiffs maintained that, on the basis of their
the two increments for the two years of service within the district - a total of four years -
the next higher step would be Step Number 5. Id.
67. Id. at 67.
68. See id. at 68.
69. See id. Plaintiff and defendant stipulated that this was the correct result and the
court found that this result was consistent with its reasoning in its first example. See id.
70. See id. at 68-69.
71. See Welsh, 46 Pa. D. & C.2d at 71-72. The court explained that, "the agreement of
employment governed the point at which the teacher entered the salary schedule, and his
entitlement to benefits thereof thereafter flowed from that point upward from year to year
until [the teacher achieved] the maximum salary under the local schedule" as long as that
maximum salary was higher than the State mandated minimum salaries. See id. at 70-71.
72. See id. at 72.
73. 347 A.2d 524 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1975).
74. See Graybill, 347 A.2d at 525.
75. See id. at 525. Wilson commenced his employment in the school year 1957-1958;
Graybill began in the years 1960-61; and Spancake and Zeigler began their employment with
the district in the school year 1962-1963. See id.
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original contract of employment with the district, they had attained
a higher placement on the salary scale than they would have
attained by years of experience.
7 6
The trial court granted teacher's motion for summary judgment
and awarded partial relief.7 Both the teachers and the district
appealed the trial court's order. 78 Relying on Welsh and several
unreported decisions, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found
that teachers hired before the date of the Act 405 amendment were
entitled to "service credit equivalent to the increment level that
they had received under their initial employment contract with the
school district."79 The court believed that its decision was
consistent with the intent of the legislature because the legislature
had appropriated $34 million that year to relieve the school
districts of the increased costs.80
In Wildrick v. Bd. of Directors of Sayre Area School District, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court was again called upon to
interpret section 1142 of the School Code.8' In Wildrick, forty-six
teachers claimed they had been underpaid with regard to the
minimum salaries set forth in the School Code.8 2 A three-judge
panel of the commonwealth court unanimously interpreted the
School Code as requiring only the payment of minimum salaries
and held that the School Code did not prescribe any formula that a
school district must follow to determine salaries that were greater
than the statutory ninimums.A8 Reaffirming its holding in Graybill,
the Wildrick court noted that a teacher's salary is governed by the
76. See id. at 526. For example, Graybill was hired at a starting salary equivalent to a
teacher with two years of experience. Combining those two years with her five years of
actual service rendered in the district, Graybill "would have attained by agreement the
equivalent of seven years of experience and would thereby be entitled to placement upon the
eighth step of the salary scale." Id. at 527. The district, however, argued that a teacher was
entitled to credit for only those years of service rendered within the district. Id. Thus,
Graybill would have only been entitled to 5 years credit, placing her on step six. Id.
77. See id. at 524.
78. See id.
79. See GraybiU, 347 A.2d at 528.
80. See id. at 527.
81. Wildrick v. Board of Dir, of Sayre Area Sch. Dist, 367 A.2d 768 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1976).
82. Wildrick, 367 A.2d. at 769. For example, a first year teacher in the district was paid
$10,000, while the minimum under state law for a first year teacher was $7,000. Id. On the
state scale, a teacher making $10,000 would be at step four on the local salary scale, and a
fourth year teacher would be entitled to a salary of $14,000. Id. The teachers thus argued
that as a first year teacher they were entitled to a salary of $14,000. Id.
83. Id. at 771. The panel consisted of Justices Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., and Rogers. Id. at
2000 1005
Duquesne Law Review
contract of employment,84 and that the salary in the contract is
subject to the minimum salary levels mandated by the School
Code.85 Noting that all of the plaintiff-teachers were paid a salary
higher than the statutory minimums set forth in the School Code,
the Wildrick court stated, "The law requires that a teacher with
certain experience and qualifications be paid a certain salary and if
a school district does that it has met its duty under the law. A
school district may not pay less, but it has not been required to pay
more."86 The court brushed aside Welsh's holding that a district
should pay a salary equivalent to the step attained by agreement or
by years of service, "whichever is higher," as dicta and inapposite
to the facts presented in Wildrick.8 1
The teachers then sought and obtained discretionary review from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Judge Roberts, writing for the
majority,88 considered the legislative intent and purpose of the
School Code and affirmed the commonwealth court's reasoning,
finding no language in the School Code that required the school
district to pay employees in excess of the statutory minimum
salaries.8 9 The majority found support for its holding in section
1152 of the School Code, which stated that no provision in the
School Code should be interpreted to interfere with, discontinue, or
prevent any salary schedule established by a school district, as long
as the schedule complied with the provisions of the School Code.90
That same year, in Robinson v. Abington Education Ass'n,91 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Wildrick to deny relief to
84. See id. at 771.
85. See id. at 769.
86. See id. at 771.
87. See Wildrick, 367 A.2d at 771.
88. Wildrick v. Board of Dir. of Sayre Area Sch. Dist., 417 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1980). Justice
Roberts was joined by Chief Justice Eagen and Justices O'Brien, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty and
Kauffman. Id. at 618.
89. See Wildrick, 417 Ak2d at 619-20. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned,
We are in agreement with the Commonwealth Court's reading of the Public School
Code .... Nothing contained in the Code, either as originally enacted or as amended,
in any respect prescribes any particular means by which greater salaries must be
determined. The sole limitation the Legislature has imposed is the requirement that a
school district comply with the applicable statewide minimum salary schedule.
Id. at 620.
The Mifflinburg Court distinguished Wildrick by noting that Wildrick's discussion of
section 1142 of the School Code addressed the narrow issue of whether the School Code's
minimum salary formulas must be utilized in calculating higher local salaries; Wildrick did
not discuss the issue of credit for past employment. Mifflinburg, 724 A.2d at 343.
90. 417 A.2d at 620.
91. 423 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 1980) (per curiam).
1006 Vol. 38:995
Education Ass'n v. Mifflinburg
special education teachers claiming that they had been illegally
deprived of salary differentials when the district and union
executed a new collective bargaining agreement.9 2 The new
agreement did not include salary differentials for the special
education teachers, who had received a higher salary than that paid
to other teachers under previous agreements.
9 3
The trial court, in an exercise, of equity jurisdiction, ordered a
reformation of the contract to award the teachers a differential
salary increment.9 4 The commonwealth court vacated the lower
court's order, finding that it lacked equity jurisdiction.95 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the trial court had properly
exercised its equity jurisdiction, but had "erred in holding the
agreement invalid under state law."96 The Robinson majority found
that section 1142 required only the payment of the statutory
minimums; once the contractual salary of the teachers exceeded
these minimums, it was permissible to pay all teachers equally,
without regard to classification.97 The court explained that the
question as to whether certain teachers should be paid more than
the state-mandated minimum should be resolved through the
collective bargaining process.
98
Five years later, the 1985 case of Kipp v. Juniata County School
District followed the Wildrick precedent by disallowing a school
employee's claim for additional back salary where the local salary
schedule exceeded the state minimum salary schedule.°00 In Kipp, a
temporary teacher argued that his five years of teaching experience
should place him on a higher step on the district's salary
92. Robinson, 423 A.2d at 1015-17.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1016.
95. See id. The commonwealth court found that the lower court lacked equity
jurisdiction because the Public School Code and the Public Employe Relations Act provided
an adequate remedy at law. Id.
96. See id. The commonwealth court held that neither the Public School Code nor the
Public Employe Relations Act provided an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 1016-17.
97. Robinson, 423 A.2d at 1017. The court noted that if the teachers were "dissatisfied
with salary provisions in a collective bargaining agreement which meet the statutory
minimum requirements, their remedy, if any, is through the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board on an unfair labor practice charge." Id. at 1018.
98. See id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kauffman maintained that interpreting
section 1142 to render classification differentials irrelevant if they exceed the statutory
minimums would "thwart the very purpose for which the statute was enacted and render
meaningless the entire legislative fabric of grouping professionals in [separate classes]." Id.
at 1021-22 (Kauffman, J., dissenting).
99. 487 A.2d 444 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
100. Kipp, 487 k2d at 446.
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schedule.101 The Court of Common Pleas of Juniata County denied
his claim under section 1142 of the School Code and under the
district's local salary schedule. 10 2 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that Wildrick
barred that portion of the teacher's claim based on years during
which the local salary schedule exceeded the state schedule.
10 3
Centennial School District v. Centennial Education Ass'n ' °4 was
the first case to address the issue of whether rehired professional
employees should be placed at the same level as newly hired
teachers on a salary schedule.'0 5  In this 1990 decision, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted sections 1142 and
1149 of the School Code to entitle individual rehired teachers to
credit for their past years of employment within a school district.
106
In Centennial, the arbitrator ruled that a statutory savings clause
within the collective bargaining agreement between the parties
incorporated by reference the School Code and made it part of the
agreement.0 7 The arbitrator reasoned that because sections 1142
and 1149 of the School Code provided for credit for previous years
of experience within the same district, and the School Code was
part of the agreement, the teachers were entitled to such credit.'08
Distinguishing Wildick and Kipp as factually dissimilar, the
commonwealth court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding his
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to derive its
essence from that agreement. 0 9
101. Id. at 445. Kipp maintained that his temporary employment contract constituted
an agreement with the district that he was to be placed at level three and a half on the
salary scale. Id. Combined with his five years of teaching experience, Kipp argued that he
should have been compensated at step eight and a half, with annual service increments
thereafter. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 446. However, Kipp was awarded $2,650.00, which represented the
difference between his salary for the years 1965 and 1971 and the minimums prescribed
under Acts 405 and 96. Id. at 447.
104. 576 A.2d 99 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
105. Centennial, 576 A.2d at 100.
106. Id. at 104.
107. Id. at 101. The preamble to the collective bargaining agreement provided, "Nothing
contained herein, however, is intended to deny or restrict any professional employee of such
rights as he/she may have under any constitutional, statutory, regulatory or decisional law."
Id.
108. See id. The arbitrator also found that section 1149, which provides that teachers
are entitled to credit only for service within the same school district, was not applicable to
the Centennial case because the Centennial employees, like the teachers in Mifflinburg,
were seeking credit for prior service within the same district. Id.
109. Id. at 103-04.
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In making its findings, the court gave broad deference to the
arbitrator's award, noting that review of an arbitrator's decision is
subject to the "essence test."110 Under the essence test, an
arbitrator's decision must be upheld "if it can, in any rational way,
be derived from the language and context of the agreement.""' If
the decision does draw its "essence" from the agreement, a
"reversal is not warranted even if a court believes the decision,
though rational, is incorrect."112 In this case, the court determined
that the arbitrator's decision was not manifestly unreasonable and
thus upheld the decision."
3
Souderton Area School District v. Souderton Area Education
Ass'n similarly sustained an arbitration award granting a teacher
credit for previous years of experience."' In this 1994 decision of
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, the teachers' association
challenged the salary placement of a teacher who had transferred
from an intermediate unit to the school district."5 The school
district credited the teacher's years of service with the intermediate
unit but did not recognize the teacher's years of service prior to her
employment with the intermediate unit."' The arbitrator concluded
that the teacher was entitled to full credit for her previous teaching
service, placing her on a higher salary step."7 The Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County upheld the arbitrator's
decision, concluding that the arbitrator's award drew its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement."8
The commonwealth court reiterated that the deferential essence
110. Centennial, 576 A-2d at 100.
111. Id. (citing Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Sch. v. Greater Johnstown
Area Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n, 553 A-2d 913, 914-15 (Pa. 1989)).
112. Id. See also Community College of Beaver County v. Society of the Faculty, 375
A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. 1977).
113. Centennial, 576 A.2d at 103.
114. 639 A.2d 904, 908 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
115. Id. at 905. Plaintiff Susan Ashmore was placed on step ten of the salary schedule
but argued that, due to her years of teaching service prior to her service with the
intermediate unit, she should have been placed on step fifteen of the scale, entitling her to
nearly $9,000 more in annual compensation. Id.
116. See id.
117. See Id. at 908. The arbitrator interpreted the Transfer Between Entities Act
(pursuant to which the plaintiff was transferred to the intermediate unit) to mean that the
plaintiff's previous years of service should be credited by the district. Id. The arbitrator
noted that the collective bargaining agreement "places the teacher on steps implicitly
equivalent to years of service as a teacher." In addition, the arbitrator found that the
"acceptance of an [intermediate unit] teacher into the Souderton School teaching group
envelops her with all the benefits of the current professional employees' agreement." Id.
118. Id. at 904.
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test is the standard governing judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding it manifestly
reasonable.119 In applying the essence test, the court determined
that the arbitration award could be rationally derived from the
collective bargaining agreement between the parties because "the
issue of placement on a salary schedule was encompassed by the
agreement."120
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's 1996 decision in
Southern Tioga Education Ass'n v. Southern Tioga School
District21 reaffirmed Wildrick and Kipp's holding that section 1142
merely obligates a school district to pay the minimum statutory
salaries.1 22 In Southern Tioga, three teachers sought back pay after
discovering that they had been placed on the incorrect step of the
district's salary schedule following breaks in employment.
123
Although the school district agreed that the teachers had been
underpaid for many years in violation of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement and the mandates of the School Code, the
arbitrator denied the teachers' request for back pay, holding that
the grievances were untimely and that the district had not violated
the School Code or the collective bargaining agreement. 24 Relying
on Wildrick and Kipp, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
agreed, finding that, where the employees' salaries exceed the
minimum requirements of section 1142, their claims for back pay
are not protected under the School Code and must rise or fall on
the basis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 2 5
More recently, Penns Manor Area School District v. Penns
Manor Area Education Ass'n126 interpreted section 1142 to require
only the payment of minimum salaries set forth in the School
Code. 127 Seven newly hired full-time employees of the Penns Manor
School District claimed that they should be credited for their prior
long-term substitute experience in calculating their placement on
119. Souderton, 639 A.2d at 904.
120. See id. at 905, 907.
121. 668 A.2d 260 (Pa. Comnmw. Ct. 1995).
122. Id. at 263.
123. See id. at 261-63.
124. See id. at 262.
125. Id. at 263. However, the court found that the parties were denied the salaries they
had bargained for under their collective bargaining agreement and reversed on that basis. Id.
at 264.
126. 697 A.2d 610 (Pa. Comnmw. Ct. 1997), rev'd, 729 A2d 71 (Pa. 1999).
127. Id. at 613.
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the salary schedule. 128 The arbitrator ordered the district to
retroactively compensate the teachers. 29 The Court of Common
Pleas of Indiana County upheld the arbitrator's decision. 30 Citing
Southern Tioga and Wildrick, the commonwealth court reversed,
finding that, because the teachers' salaries at all times exceeded
the minimum requirements of section 1142, the arbitrator's
interpretation of section 1142 was contrary to established case
law.13' However, in 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed
the order of the Commonwealth Court in light of its Mifflinburg
decision.1
32  I
Prior to Mifflinburg, the majority of case law interpreting section
1142 of the School Code limited its scope to the sole requirement
that a district compensate its employees at the minimum salary
levels established in the Code. The language of section 1142, as
enacted and as amended, contains no express guidelines to aid a
school district in establishing a local salary schedule awarding
salaries that are greater than the statutory minimums.
In overturning the Mifflinburg arbitrator's interpretation of
section 1142, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court employed a very
narrow scope of review known as the essence test, which
overturns an arbitrator's award only if it was manifestly
unreasonable.3 3 In finding that section 1142 requires crediting a
teacher's prior years of service, the Mifflinburg court dismissed
Wildrick as factually inapplicable and relied heavily on Centennial.
However, the Centennial decision provides no insight into why
section 1142 compels such a reading. In its analysis, the Centennial
court merely distinguishes Wildrick and Kipp as factually irrelevant
and conclusorily declares that sections 1142 and 1149 of the School
Code "contain language" that requires a district to credit teachers
for all years of service within the district.1'1
128. See id. at 611.
129. See id. at 612. The teachers were to be compensated "retroactive to their date of
hire as permanent teachers or to a date twelve work days prior to the filing of the grievance,
whichever was latest." Id. In granting relief to the teachers, the arbitrator relied on Central
Bucks School Dist., 49 Pa D. & C.3d 254 (1988), which granted credit to permanently hired
teachers following prior experience as substitute teachers in the district. Id.
130. Penns Manor, 697 A.2d at 611.
131. Id. at 613. The court accepted the District's argument that, under Southern Tioga
and Wildrick, section 1142 requires only the payment of minimum salaries set forth in the
School Code. Id.
132. Penns Manor Area Sch. Dist. v. Penns Manor Educ. Ass'n, 729 A.2d 71 (Pa. 1999).
133. Community College of Beaver County v. Society of the Faculty, 375 A-2d 1267,
1274-75 (Pa. 1977).
134. Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Centennial Educ. Ass'n, 576 A.2d 99, 104 (Pa Commw. Ct.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Mifflinburg
appears to be a policy decision grounded in notions of fairness and
equity. At first glance, paying experienced teachers the same salary
as newly hired professionals seems highly inequitable, especially
when the teacher's original experience was gained within the same
school district. Furthermore, most of the educators who sustained
large breaks in employment were women who left to give birth and
raise children.1 35 Failure to credit past years of service would
penalize these women for taking unpaid maternity leave or time off
to care for children, particularly in a time before the enactment of
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.136
Yet some would argue the decision is far from fair. In the
Mifflinburg case, "each employee resigned with no promise or
expectation of future re-employment." 137 Unlike the Family and
Medical Leave Act, which guarantees a professional's position for
up to twelve weeks,138 each of the eight teacher-grievants remained
unemployed for periods from five to fourteen years.13 9 Upon rehire,
the employees were placed on the salary schedule at salaries in
excess of the statutory minimums. To interpret section 1142 to
require credit for prior years of service to employees who
voluntarily removed themselves from the workplace, in some
instances for over a decade, may stretch the limits of statutory
construction.
In addition, the Court's decision will have an enormous financial
impact on Pennsylvania school districts. School officials estimate
that providing raises to a dozen eligible teachers would cost a
district an additional $175,000 a year.'40 The Mifflinburg School
District, a rural district paying relatively low salaries, paid nearly
1990).
135. For example, Linda Gerst, a first grade teacher, worked for the Mifflinburg School
District from 1968 to 1976, went on maternity leave, returned as a permanent substitute from
1982 to 1984, and was rehired as a full-time teacher in 1985. Reproduced Record, 92a - 93a.
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994). The Family and Medical Leave Act ensures up to 12
weeks of unpaid leave for a variety of purposes, including the birth or adoption of a child.
Id.
137. Appellee's Brief at 17, Mifflinburg Area Educ. Ass'n v. Mifflinburg Area Sch. Dist.,
724 A.2d 339 (Pa. 1999) (No. 0140).
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
139. Id. at 2. The record reflects the following breaks in service: (1) Carol Brann, 13
years; (2) Molly Criswell, 7 years; (3) Janet Edwards, 8 years; (4) Linda Gerst, 5'/2 years; (5)
Mary Louise O'Brien, 101/2 years; (6) Barbara Randecker, 12 years; (7) Sally Rothermel, 10
years; and (8) Joanne Sauers, 14 years. Id.
140. See Carmen J. Lee and Laura Pace, Rehired Teachers Can't Lose Their Seniority,
PrrSBURGH POST-GAZEntE, April 18, 1999, at D3.
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$400,000 in salary increases as a result of the decision. 141 The
financial consequences for school districts in urban areas could
approach one million dollars.142 Many districts may not have
budgeted for such unplanned salary increases, and the Mifflinburg
decision may ultimately affect tax dollars.
The court's decision has also raised concern among teachers
themselves. Some worry whether the prospect of compensating a
rehired teacher for previous years of service will compel districts
to hire new and less expensive educators.14 Such a practice could
be particularly devastating to professionals in rural areas where a
teacher's prospect of reemployment is severely limited.
Finally, the decision leaves unanswered important questions such
as retroactivity of the decision, whether affected professionals are
entitled to backpay, and whether the ruling includes teachers who
had previously worked as permanent substitutes. Because the
decision was a close one (3-2) and Justice Newman did not
participate, it will be interesting to see how these issues will be
resolved in future litigation before a full court.
The Mifflinburg decision has engendered a great deal of
controversy among educators, school authorities, and union
officials. 1 While the decision may help to ensure that teachers are
paid in accordance with their years of teaching experience, it will
have a serious monetary impact on Pennsylvania school districts
and may ultimately hinder opportunities for experienced teachers
as districts seek to keep costs at a minimum.
Sally A. Kane
141. Telephone interview with Philip V. McCalister, Esq., counsel for Miffiinburg Area
School District (August 2 ,1999). According to counsel for the Mifflinburg School District, the
District paid a total of $388,492 in salary increases and backpay to the eight
teacher-grievants. Id.
142. Id. The president of the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers and the Pennsylvania
Federation of Teachers stated that "the financial impact of the ruling could be particularly
difficult for districts that have salary scales with 20 or more steps and that tend to place
rehired teachers on lower rungs regardless of previous experience." Lee and Pace, supra
note 140, at D3.
143. Lee and Pace, supra note 140, at D3. In fact, some school officials have conceded
that such a favoring new employees may occur. Id. Joseph Oravitz, executive Director of
Pennsylvania School Boards Association explained, "If in order to hire a previously employed
teacher a district has to pay out higher wages and couldn't negotiate the salary, then a new
person could become an alternative." Id.
144. Id. at Dl.
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